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ARGUMENT 
I. THE JUVENILE COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
1. Appellee, Division of Family and Child Services, hereinafter referred to as "the 
Division", argues that because either party is entitled to a trial de novo after the informal 
proceeding, that it does not matter where the complaint for review is filed. Appellant does not 
disagree as to the definition of a trial de novo and that the court conducting the trial de novo is 
not bound by the determination below. However, it is axiomatic that the court conducting the 
trial de novo must have subject matter jurisdiction to accept the case. Sheppick v. Albertson's, 
Inc., 922 P.2d 769,775 (Utah, 1996); Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 
1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1993.) 
2. If we follow the Division's logic and return as if the case was beginning over 
again at the point when the Division had first taken its action, then we must look for the source 
of judicial subject matter jurisdiction over the Division action at that point in time. 
3. The Division made a substantiated finding of abuse or neglect pursuant to U.C.A. 
§62A-4a-202.3 and §62A-4a-409 and was obligated by U.C.A. §62A-4a-116.5(l)(a) to notify 
Appellant of the results of its investigation. Appellant's remedy granting him his constitutional 
right to due process is provided in U.C.A. §62A-4a-l 16 and U.C.A. §62A-4a-l 16.5, i.e., the right 
to request an administrative hearing within 30 days and put the Division to its proof of its 
allegations. U.C.A. §62A-4a-116.5(4)(a). Failure to request the administrative hearing would 
have resulted in the Division findings becoming unappealable. U.C.A. §62A-4a-116.5(l)(f). 
The judicial subject matter jurisdiction of this case or controversy at the point in time when the 
Division first took its action was exclusively under the Administrative Procedures Act. Neither 
the District Court nor the Juvenile Court had subject matter jurisdiction. 
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4. The only way the District Court gains subject matter jurisdiction in this case is 
pursuant to U.C.A. §63-46b-15 which assigns to the District Court the power to review by trial 
de novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings. Accordingly, 
the fact that the administrative hearing occurred in this case is a condition precedent to the 
existence of subject matter jurisdiction in the District Court but the right to a trial de novo from 
final agency action resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings relieves the District Court 
from being bound by the findings of the administrative court. The applicable standard of proof 
and the burden of persuasion to be used before the judicial tribunal must be construed to be as set 
forth in U.C.A. §62A-4a-l 16.5(4)(a) which requires the Division to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that child abuse or neglect occurred and 
that the person was substantially responsible for the abuse or neglect that occurred. 
5. The Juvenile Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and through §63-46b-15(l)(a) 
is delegated specific statutory authority to review by trial de novo substantiated findings of abuse 
or neglect pursuant to U.C.A. §62A-4a-116.5. The Juvenile Court is not delegated statutory 
authority to review agency action taken pursuant to U.C.A. §62A-4a-202.3 and §62A-4a-409. 
Had the legislature intended for the Juvenile Court to have subject matter jurisdiction to review 
by trial de novo unsubstantiated findings of abuse or neglect pursuant to U.C.A. §62A-4a-
116.5, it could easily have done so. It did not and has not and absent a statutory delegation of 
jurisdiction, the Juvenile Court was without the power or authority to assume subject matter 
jurisdiction in this case. 
6. The only arguable repository of subject matter jurisdiction to review by trial de 
novo unsubstantiated findings of abuse or neglect pursuant to U.C.A. §62A-4a-l 16.5 was in the 
District Court and it was fatal error for the Juvenile Court to accept subject matter jurisdiction. 
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7. The Division concedes on page 17 of its brief in the section entitled "Oral 
Argument and Published Opinion" that it anticipates that these issues will be raised in the future 
and guidance to attorneys litigating these types of cases would be of value. Appellant agrees that 
this appeal is on an issue of first impression for the reason that the Division has not previously 
sought review of an unsubstantiated finding from the administrative court. 
8. The Division's argument that it is as if the case was beginning over again at the 
point when the Division had first taken its action necessarily fails. Otherwise U.C.A. §62A-4a-
116.5 would be a right without a remedy for the person branded with the Division's substantiated 
finding of abuse or neglect and the person would be denied his or her constitutional rights of due 
process and equal protection under the law. 
9. The Juvenile Court committed fatal error in hearing this case as it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction and its ruling should be ordered null and void. 
n. THE JUVENILE COURT APPLIED THE INCORRECT STANDARD OF LAW 
A. The Juvenile Court's Conclusion of Law Incorrectly Relies on the Findings 
of the Division of Child and Family Services 
10. As set forth within Appellant's brief, the trial court incorrectly determined that the 
standard of proof was that the Division acted reasonably when concluding that abuse had 
occurred. The State argues that Appellant's argument is so frivolous that it cannot be considered. 
However, a plain reading of the Court's conclusions of law shows that the trial court did not 
make a conclusion that the Division proved to the court by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the abuse occurred rather than the Division acted reasonably. The dichotomy between the trial 
court's conclusions of law and the administrative law judge's conclusion provides insight as to 
whether or not the trial court applied the correct standard. The trial court's conclusions of law 
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specifically state "1) There was a reasonable basis for the Division of Child and Family Services 
to conclude that [S.R.] had been sexually abused; 2) There was a reasonable basis for the 
Division of Child and Family Services to conlcude (sic) that Bret Riley was substantially 
responsible for the sexual abuse of [S.R.]". (R. 45). Whereas the administrative law judge based 
his determination that the findings should be unsubstantiated by stating "[t]he undersigned finds 
that the Claimant has failed to meet its burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that 
the Respondent is substantially responsible for sexual abuse." The administrative law judge 
applied the correct standard—the Division must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the respondent is substantially responsible for sexual abuse. The trial court, however, applied a 
lesser standard—that the Division reasonably concluded that the respondent is substantially 
responsible for sexual abuse. 
11. If the trial court had applied the correct standard it would have made conclusions 
of law that stated the Division has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that abuse 
occurred. The trial court did not make such a conclusion, instead concluding that it was 
reasonable for the Division to conclude that abuse occurred. The Division's argument that 
Appellant's argument is frivolous fails to even address a modicum of the issue raised by 
Appellant. That is, why did the trial court fail to make any findings as to the underlying 
allegations and fail to make a conclusion that the Division met its burden of proof? The statutory 
language specifically requires the Division to prove its case. The Division argues in its brief that 
it must prove its case to itself and then show the trial court that it acted reasonably. Of course, 
there is no credible support for such an argument. The plain language of the statute requires the 
Division to prove by a preponderance of the evidence to the trier of fact that there "is" a 
reasonable basis to conclude that abuse occurred, not that there "was" a reasonable basis for the 
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Division to conclude that abuse occurred. Although the Division in a footnote rejects any 
distinction between the language as suggested herein, the distinction between the language is the 
substantive dispositive issue. That is, if the trial court concluded that the Division met its burden 
of proof to convince the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence that it "is" reasonable to 
conclude that abuse occurred, why then did the trial court make a conclusion of law that stated 
there "was" a reasonable basis for the Division to conclude that the abuse occurred. The plain 
language of the trial court's order controls the issue. The Division cannot argue that the plain 
language of the trial court's order is irrelevant or that the difference between the language in the 
court's order and the statute is "so negligible as to be insignificant". 
12. The trial court made a specific change to the proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law submitted by the Division. (Addendum A hereto.)1 Within its proposed 
conclusions of law, the Division suggested that the trial court conclude that S.R. was abused by 
Bret Riley and that Bret Riley was substantially responsible for the abuse of S.R. The trial court 
specifically rejected the Division's proposed conclusions and instead adopted conclusions stating 
that the Division acted reasonably in concluding that the abuse had occurred. The trial court thus 
applied a standard different than that suggested by the Division and different than that required 
by the statute with the result that the trial court applied a standard of a lesser burden of proof for 
the Division. 
1
 Appellant attaches the Division's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law hereto because for some 
reason it was not contained within the record below even though it was filed with the trial court as required by the 
trial court. 
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B. By Requiring Appellant to Prove that the Division acted Unreasonably, the 
Trial Court Incorrectly Shifted the Burden of Proof to Appellant 
13. The harm resulting from the improper shift of the applicable burden of proof was 
the denial of Appellant's constitutional right to the due process of law. As is apparent from the 
Findings and Conclusions and Order entered by the Juvenile Court, Appellant was required by 
that court to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the determination by the Division in 
substantiating findings of abuse or neglect were not reasonable. Rather than the Division being 
put to its proof, Appellant was burden with proving a negative. 
14. Appellant was thereby denied equal protection under the law as specified in 
U.C.A. §62A-4a-116.5 which required the Division, when its substantiated finding was 
challenged, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable basis to 
conclude that the child abuse or neglect occurred and the person was substantially responsible for 
the abuse or neglect that occurred. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE ANY FINDINGS AS TO THE 
UNDERLYING ALLEGATIONS 
A. The Trial Court is Required to Determine that the Division of Child and 
Family Services Met its Burden of Proof 
15. The Division urges that Appellant is in error when he argues that the trial court is 
required to make its own findings that abuse actually occurred instead of determining that the 
Division had a reasonable basis to make those conclusions. In support of its argument, the 
Division refers the plain language of U.C.A. § 62A-4a-116.5 that states "the division shall prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that: (i) child 
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abuse or neglect, as described in § 62A-4a-116(5) (b), occurred; and (ii) the person was 
substantially responsible for the abuse or neglect that occurred." The Division then concludes 
that the plain language of the statute allows the trial court to merely adopt and ratify the findings 
of the Division. If the Division's interpretation of the plain language of the statute were correct, 
then the plain language of the statute would say that the "division shall prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that it had a reasonable basis to conclude that abuse had occurred." 
Unfortunately for the Division, the plain language of the statute requires it to prove to the court 
that there "is" a reasonable basis for the court to conclude that abuse occurred, rather than there 
"was" a reasonable basis for the Division to conclude that abuse had occurred. In this case, the 
trial court determined that there was a reasonable basis for the Division to conclude that abuse 
occurred rather than determining by findings of fact that the Division proved that it "is" 
reasonable for the court to conclude that abuse occurred. 
16. The distinction is crucial. U.C.A, § 62A-4a-l 16.5 clearly requires the Division to 
be prepared to support its finding of substantiation with evidence sufficient to survive judicial 
scrutiny as to substance and reason. The Division's interpretation urged upon this court would 
effectively eviscerate the meaning and effect of U.C.A. § 62A-4a-116.5 which guarantees to the 
accused his or her constitutional right to due process to hear and confront witnesses and evidence 
and to be allowed to present exculpatory evidence and testimony. 
17. The Division fails to address the issue of the clear weight of the evidence against 
a finding of abuse except by its blanket argument that the trial court is not required to make a 
finding as to credibility. As set forth within Appellant's brief, Appellant presented evidence that 
militates against a finding that abuse in fact occurred. A review of the testimony in total shows 
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that the Division failed to sustain its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence 
that abuse occurred and that Appellant was substantially responsible for it. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Juvenile Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter and its order 
should be held null and void. 
Alternatively, the trial court applied the incorrect standard by concluding that it was 
reasonable for the Division to conclude that abuse had occurred rather than it was reasonable for 
the trial court to conclude that abuse had occurred. The error in the standard of proof requires 
remand; and 
The trial court erroneously concluded that abuse had occurred because the overwhelming 
evidence presented to the trial court supported a conclusion that the abuse did not occur and 
could not have occurred. The matter should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to 
conclude that the allegations of abuse are unsubstantiated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1 Oth da^fOctobe ^ 2 0 0 1 ^ j 
C - ^ — ^ ^ Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT DESCRIPTION 
1. The Division's Proposed Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and 
Order 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit 1. The Division's proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
KAELA P. JACKSON - 8 8 95 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF - 4 66 6 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for the State of Utah 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 3 66-0250 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, ) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
DIVISION OF CHILD AND FAMILY ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
SERVICES, L 
Petitioner, ) 
) Case No. 997188 
v. ) 
BRET RILEY, ) Judge Robert S. Yeates 
Respondent ) 
The above-named matter came before the Court on January 10, 
2001, for trial on the Division of Child and Family Services' 
Petition for Judicial Review of an administrative hearing 
decision made on July 17, 2000. The following parties were 
present: Kaela P. Jackson, Assistant Attorney General, 
representing the Division of Child and Family Services; Lee 
Manley, Division of Child and Family Services; Trena Adams, 
Division of Child and Family Services; Bret Riley, respondent; 
and Bart Johnson, counsel for Mr. Riley. 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
Mr. Johnson addressed the Court regarding the Motion in 
Limine he filed on January 4, 2 001. Mr. Johnson argued that 
evidence regarding allegations of sexual abuse by Ashley Riley 
McQuivy against Bret Riley should be excluded under Rule 404 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. The State argued that the evidence 
should not be excluded by Rule 404 as it is not being offered to 
prove Mr. Riley's character, but only to show what the Division 
relied on to find that there was a reasonable basis to conclude 
that child abuse occurred. The Court noted that the issue before 
the Court was whether there was a reasonable basis to conclude 
that abuse or neglect occurred. The Court found that the 
Division had an obligation to interview Ms. McQuivey and that the 
evidence was admissible under Rule 404(3)(b). The Court denied 
the motion. 
CASE IN CHIEF 
The State made an opening statement, and called the 
following witnesses: 
1. Lee Manley 
2. Stacey Riley 
3. Shelly Riley 
The State rested. Mr. Johnson called the following 
witnesses: 
1. Brittney Riley 
2. Betty Jo Riley 
3. Ashley Riley McQuivey 
4. Bret Riley 
Mr. Johnson rested. The State and Mr. Johnson made closing 
argument to the Court. 
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After considering the evidence presented, cne uourc majces 
the following findings of fact by a preponderance of the 
evidence: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Bret Riley is the paternal uncle of Stacey Riley. 
Stacey Riley is a sixteen year old female child, born on April 
24, 1984. 
2. On or about December 25, 1997, Stacey reported to her 
mother and father, Shane and Shelly Riley, that on two separate 
occasions, Bret Riley inappropriately touched her. 
3. Stacey reported that on December 25, 1997, while at 
a family Christmas Party at Bret Riley's home, Mr. Riley 
approached Stacey from behind and grabbed her breasts over her 
clothing with his hands, squeezing them. Stacey reported that 
she elbowed Mr. Riley in the ribs and ran upstairs to tell her 
mother about what had happened. 
4. Stacey also reported that in August, 1997, while 
spending the night at Bret Riley's home, she awakened twice in 
the middle of the night to find her shirt pulled up around her 
neck, her bra unfastened and Mr. Riley rubbing her bare back. 
Each time, Stacey wiggled her arms and Mr. Riley left the room. 
5. After Stacey told her parents about the abuse, her 
father warned her mother not to discuss the allegations with 
anyone. 
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6. A few days after Stacey reported the abuse to her 
parents, Shelly Riley contacted her older daughter, Ashley 
McQuivey, and asked her whether Bret Riley had ever touched her 
inappropriately. Ashley came over to her parents' home that 
night and told Stacey and her mother about three separate 
incidents, occurring when Ashley was between the ages of twelve 
and fifteen, when Bret Riley inappropriately touched her. The 
first two incidents involved Mr. Riley grabbing Ashley's breasts 
over her clothing and squeezing them while the two were 
wrestling. The third incident involved Mr. Riley rubbing 
Ashley's knee. 
7. Shelly Riley did not discuss the allegations with 
anyone other than her two daughters and her husband. 
8. In January, 1999, Shane and Shelly Riley separated and 
in February, 1999, Shelly Riley filed for divorce. 
9. In March, 1999, Stacey Riley came to her mother in 
tears, begging her not to make Stacey go to a family birthday 
party where Bret Riley would be present. Shelly Riley contacted 
her lawyer, Wendy Lems, and told her of Stacey's concerns. Ms. 
Riley also told Ms. Lems about the allegations her daughters had 
made against Bret Riley. Ms. Lems advised Ms. Riley to have her 
daughters write letters about what Bret Riley had done to them. 
10. Both Stacey and Ashley wrote letters containing 
allegations of inappropriate touching by Bret Riley and Ms. Lems 
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presented them to Commissioner Lisa Jones at a hearing on the 
divorce action in the Third District Court. Commissioner Jones 
issued an Order prohibiting contact between Stacey and Bret 
Riley. 
11. While the Court's no contact order was in effect, 
Stacey reported to her mother that her father had allowed Bret 
Riley to have contact with her. Stacey reported that she was at 
her grandparents home visiting her father when Bret Riley 
arrived. After Stacey's father did not ask Mr. Riley to leave, 
Stacey got up and left the room. 
12. In June, 1999, Stacey's mother discussed the 
allegations against Mr. Riley with Allen Call, a family friend 
and West Valley City police officer. Mr. Call met with Stacey 
and advised her to contact law enforcement and make a report of 
the allegations. 
13. On or about June 28, 1999, Shelly Riley contacted the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department and made a report of the 
allegations. 
14. On or about July 14, 1999, Detective Jaroscak, from the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department, interviewed Stacey and 
Ashley separately at the Children's Justice Center. 
15. During the interview, Ashley told Detective Jaroscak 
about the two times Bret Riley grabbed and squeezed her breasts 
and about the incident when he rubbed her knee. Ashley became 
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tearful while describing the incidents to Detective Jaroscak. 
16. During Detective Jarcoscak's interview with Stacey, she 
told him about the August, 1997 incident when Bret Riley pulled 
up her shirt, unfastened her bra, and rubbed her back. She also 
told him about the December, 1997 incident when Mr. Riley grabbed 
and squeezed her breasts. 
17. On or about July 20, 1999, Lee Manley, Child Protective 
Services investigator, received a referral alleging that Mr. 
Riley had sexually abused Stacey Riley. The referral also 
contained information that Mr. Riley had inappropriately touched 
Ashley, who was twenty years old at the time of the referral. 
18. During his investigation, Mr. Manley interviewed both 
Stacey and Ashley separately regarding the allegations in the 
referral. Mr. Manley informed both girls that he did not need 
them to go into the specifics of the allegations as both Stacey 
and Ashley had already been interviewed by Detective Jaroscak. 
Mr. Manley asked Stacey and Ashley whether anyone had encouraged 
them to make up the allegations. Both girls denied that they had 
been encouraged to make up the allegations. 
19. During Mr. Manley's interview with Ashley, she told him 
about the two times Bret Riley grabbed her breasts and about the 
time he rubbed her knee. Mr. Manley testified that he found 
Ashley's account of the incidents to be credible. 
20. Mr. Johnson, counsel for Bret Riley, posited that Mrs. 
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Riley had influenced Stacey and Ashley or coached them. However, 
no credible evidence was presented to support this claim. Mr. 
Manley interviewed both girls and viewed the videotape of the 
interview by Detective Jaroscak. Mr. Manley testified that he 
saw no evidence that the children were coached by their mother, 
or anyone else and that he found both Ashley and Stacey to be 
credible. 
21. The Court finds that Stacey's account of the incidents 
that took place in August and December, 1997 is credible and 
consistent. 
22. Based on the above, the Court finds that in August, 
1997, Bret Riley pulled up Stacey's shirt while she was sleeping, 
unfastened her bra, and rubbed her bare back. In December, 1997, 
Mr. Riley approached Stacey from behind and grabbed her breasts 
over her clothing. 
Based on the above findings of fact, the Court makes the 
following conclusions of law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In August and December, 1997, Stacey Riley was abused, 
in that Bret Riley took indecent liberties with her with the 
intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of either himself 
or the child or with the intent to cause substantial bodily pain; 
2. Bret Riley was substantially responsible for the abuse 
of Stacey Riley; 
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3. The Division of Child and Family Services acted 
reasonably in substantiating referral number: 997188. 
Based on the above, the Court makes the following Order: 
ORDER 
1. The substantiation made by the Division of Child and 
Family Services on referral number: 997188 is upheld. 
DATED this day of , 2001. 
BY THE COURT 
HONORABLE ROBERT S. YEATES 
Juvenile Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that, on this /& day of 
2 001, I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Finings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order to the following parties by 
first class mail, postage prepaid or personal delivery: 
Bart Johnson 
Richman and Richman 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Nancy Bender, Hearing Tracker 
Department of Human Services 
Division of Child and Family Services 
120 North 200 West, Suite 225 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Lee Manley, DCFS 
Trena Adams, DCFS ^ "'^) 
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